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If 2017 was the year of a serious military crisis on the 
Korean Peninsula, 2018 may be marked as the year 
of summit diplomacy for denuclearizing North Korea. 
There were numerous rounds of summit meetings; 
three inter-Korean, one U.S.-North Korea, and three 
China-North Korea summits. According to media 
reports, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s visit to 
Seoul and the second U.S.-North Korea summit are 
expected by early 2019. 
This was an important turn toward a positive direction. 
For example, three inter-Korean summit meetings have 
made a significant contribution to reducing military 
tension and opened the road to peace-settlement 
between the two Koreas. However, there was not much 
progress in terms of denuclearization of North Korea 
since the historic U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore 
last June. 
The reason for the little progress is the clash between 
the U.S. position and North Korea’s position on the 
formula of denuclearization. U.S. policy-makers are 
demanding North Korea to give up its nuclear program 
or make irreversible steps for denuclearization before 
it receives substantial return from the U.S. For instance, 
the U.S. demands North Korea to declare the whole 
inventory of its nuclear program upfront and to come 
to the negotiation table to discuss a concrete timeline 
and roadmap for denuclearization.
In contrast, North Korea is arguing that establishing a 
normal U.S.-North Korea relationship is the first thing 
to do. North Korean negotiators claim that now is the 
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U.S.’ turn to match North Korea’s concessions such 
as freezing on nuclear testing and missile launching, 
dismantling Punggye-ri nuclear test site, etc., by 
beginning to lift economic sanctions. And they are 
declining the U.S. request to have working-level talks, 
for example, between Steve Biegun, the U.S. special 
representative, and Choe Son-hui, North Korea’s vice 
foreign minister.
Despite the historic U.S.-North Korea summit in 
June, little progress was made on denuclearizing 
North Korea due to the clash between the 
U.S. and North Korea on the formula of 
denuclearization. Both sides are demanding 
the other to do its work upfront. Due to the 
inability to resolve this dilemma, North Korea’s 
nuclear problem has gotten worse during 
the last three decades. In order to make a 
breakthrough, North Korea needs to come 
to the table as soon as possible recognizing 
that the political momentum for a negotiated 
solution in the U.S. may not last long due to 
President Trump’s domestic problems. The U.S. 
needs to take a more pragmatic approach. 
While keeping the pressure with economic 
sanctions, it needs to take concrete measures 
of political engagement toward North Korea. 
This would contribute significantly to raising 
mutual trust and providing a more favorable 
political environment for negotiating a solution.
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The U.S. high-level officials are suspicious of the 
intention of the North Korean authorities. They think 
that North Korea has taken just a few unimportant 
symbolic actions instead of taking critical measures 
to denuclearization. In the eyes of U.S. policy-makers, 
North Koreans want to have their cake and eat it too, 
that is, they want economic sanctions lifted, political 
relations normalized, without giving up their whole 
nuclear program.     
The same dilemma, that is, one side demanding 
the other to do its work upfront, has always been 
there since the beginning of the nuclear crisis in the 
early 1990s. The inability of the international actors 
to resolve this dilemma was the reason why North 
Korea’s nuclear problem has gradually worsened 
during the last three decades. The only exceptional 
case of freezing, if not rooting out, the North Korean 
nuclear program for 8 years, was achieved by the 
Clinton administration. The Clinton administration 
produced the Geneva Agreed Framework in October 
1994 and engaged North Korea politically during 
1999-2000.
With mutual distrust between the U.S. and North 
Korea being so high, it was almost impossible to 
reach an agreement without engaging North Korea 
politically. In that regard, President Trump’s political 
engagement of North Korea and its product, the 
Singapore Agreement, marked an important shift of 
the U.S. policy toward a positive direction. However, 
the remaining issues are how to translate President 
Trump’s declaration of political engagement into 
more concrete U.S. actions toward North Korea and 
how to make North Korea take substantial measures 
toward denuclearization. In this regard, a few 
recommendations might be considered.
Firstly, North Korea needs to come to the negotiation 
table as soon as possible. The North Korean leaders 
may think they can bypass the lower-level U.S. 
bureaucrats and achieve their goals by directly talking 
to President Trump. However, they will soon recognize 
that the American political system does not work that 
way. In the last several months after the Singapore 
summit, the U.S. side has become more flexible and 
ready. Also, North Korean policy-makers had better 
keep in mind that this momentum for a negotiated 
solution may not last long due to President Trump’s 
domestic political problems. In other words, the 
window of opportunity for North Korea to achieve 
its newly defined national goal, that is, economic 
development through a negotiated solution of the 
nuclear problem, may not be open for long.
Secondly, the U.S. policy-makers need to take a more 
pragmatic approach in pursuing denuclearization 
of North Korea. Demanding North Korea to declare 
its nuclear inventory upfront may not produce a 
successful result. In this regard, the past history of 30 
years of nuclear diplomacy is telling. Due to the high 
level of mutual distrust, North Korea could regard the 
U.S. demand as pressure to submit a target list. Even 
in the case that North Korea makes a declaration, 
debates on the veracity of the declaration will probably 
stall the whole process of negotiation.
Instead, it would be be more realistic for the U.S. 
to take North Korea’s suggestion of dismantling 
Yongbyon nuclear facilities while pushing the demand 
for North Korea’s declaration. This will make the real 
negotiation start and mark an important beginning of 
the long process of denuclearization. Some say that 
Yongbyon nuclear facilities are no longer valuable, 
which may not necessarily be the case. In addition 
to dismantling the biggest symbol of North Korea’s 
nuclear program, international inspectors will be able 
to get important information about the current state 
of plutonium, uranium enrichment, and hydrogen 
bomb projects. 
Finally, the U.S., while keeping the pressure with 
economic sanctions, needs to take more concrete 
political measures of engaging North Korea. This 
would contribute significantly to raising mutual trust 
and providing a more favorable political environment 
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for negotiating a solution. Another beneficial 
measure may be producing a declaration of the 
end of the Korean War. Some experts worry that 
the declaration would become a slippery slope and 
lead to the weakening of the U.S.-ROK alliance. But 
that will be so only when both allies let it happen. 
If not a peace declaration, establishing a liaison 
office in Pyongyang, as former Director of National 
Intelligence James Clapper recommended, would 
be another meaningful measure for the U.S. to take. 
Encouraging dialogue between the North Korean 
policy-makers and the leaders of international 
financial institutions for exchanging information, 
discussing North Korea’s future membership and 
inviting North Korean performers or sports teams 
to the U.S. would be regarded as other important 
gestures of good will. Raising the level of mutual trust 
through these measures will contribute significantly 
to a successful negotiation.  
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